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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The digest includes cases that
apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and references
are given for further research.
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1. ADMIRALTY
COURT SITTING IN ADMIRALTY MAY GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO
PREVENT MARITIME INSURER FROM "BLACKLISTING" SEAMEN WITHOUT
CAUSE

Seamen who had previously prosecuted personal injury claims
against a maritime protection indemnity insurer brought an admiralty action alleging that the insurer was tortiously and unjustifia-

bly "blacklisting" them from seagoing employment by demanding
extra insurance from their prospective employers. The district
court found that the insurers were engaged in intentional tortious
interference with plaintiffs' employment and awarded temporary
injunctive relief pending a hearing on damages. Additionally, the
lower court rejected the insurer's claims that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant equitable relief. The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court's holding that a district court sitting in admiralty can
both hear tort claims and award equitable relief, but found that
the insurer could require vessel owners to submit "settlement
sheets" including the names of employees after each voyage. The
court relied on both Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) and
a change in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 that extends the Rules to admiralty
cases. Specifically, the appellate court found that both the Supreme Court and Congress were willing to give courts sitting in
admiralty the flexibility to grant whatever relief was proper under
the circumstances and that traditional limitations on admiralty
jurisdiction were no longer valid. Significance - This is the first
decision to solidify trends in statutory and case law by expressly
allowing district courts sitting in admiralty to award injunctive
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relief. Pino v. ProtectionMaritimeInsurance Co., 599 F.2d 10 (1st
Cir. 1979).
EXPENSES OF JUSTICE INCLUDE ONLY THOSE STORAGE EXPENSES
INCURRED AFTER THE FILING OF A FORFEITURE ACTION BY THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT

The M/V PHGH was seized by the United States government for
carrying contraband. Plaintiff brought an action in rem seeking
damages resulting from the ship's diversion from its legitimate
voyage and its accompanying seizure by the United States. The
United States then brought a forfeiture action, claiming storage
expenses from the time the vessel was seized until the time plaintiff took over the storage charges. The Government classified these
costs as an "expense of justice," thus giving them priority over all
liens. Plaintiff objected, claiming that the United States was entitled to have priority only on those storage expenses incurred after
the filing of the forfeiture action. The district court held for the
plaintiff, rejecting the government's claim for three reasons: (1)
the expenses that accrued prior to the filing of the forfeiture action
were not incurred by the United States as a Court - appointed
custodian; (2) the pre - forfeiture expenses are not "proper" within
19 U.S.C. § 1613(a)(1) because of the unreasonable delay by the
Government; and (3) due to the unreasonable delay the claim is
barred by laches. Significance - This decision narrows the interpretation of "expenses of justice" as it applies to storage expenses,
distinguishing between those incurred prior to the filing of the
forfeiture action and those filed thereafter. Rayon Y Celanese Peruana v. M/V PHGH, 471 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Ala. 1979).
2.

ALIENS' RIGHTS

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE MAY APPEAL AN IMMIGRA-

TION JUDGE'S DECISION TO GRANT AN ALIEN RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION UNDER SECTION

212(c) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY

ACT
A resident alien convicted on two separate counts of distribution
and conspiracy to distribute cocaine was found deportable under
section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act),
but was granted relief from deportation under section 212(c). The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, and the
Board of Immigration Appeals ordered the deportation of the resident alien. Petitioning the court of appeals, the resident alien
claimed: (1) pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b) (3) & 212.2, the Board
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of Immigration Appeals lacked jurisdiction over an appeal by the
INS from an immigration judge's grant of section 212(c) relief, and
(2) the INS failed to file its appeal within the five-day period
specified in 8 C.F.R. § 236.7(c). The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that although the regulation makes no specific reference
to a right of appeal by the INS, its silence does not imply the
absence of such a right. The court stated that nothing in section
212(c) suggests that the Attorney General intended to provide an
appeal to an alien denied relief, while denying appeal by the INS
when relief from deportation was granted. Further, the court noted
that nothing compels the conclusion that an immigration judge
has the final decision concerning the exercise of discretionary authority by the INS. The court also denied the resident alien's claim
that the appeal by the INS to the Board was untimely. Because
the application for section 212(c) relief was made in connection
with a deportation hearing rather than an exclusionary hearing,
the appeal was timely filed within the ten-day period specified
in 8 C.F.R. § 242.21. Significance - This decision expands the
jurisdiction of the Board of Immigration Appeals to include
appeals by the INS from an immigration judge's grant of section
212(c) relief, in spite of the absence of a specific statutory provision. Byus-Narvaez v. INS, No. 78-3164 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 1979).
3.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FOURTH AMENDMENT No BAR TO WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF FOREIGN
FISHING VESSEL AUTHORIZED BY FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976

Defendant Japanese fishing vessel, 167 miles offshore, was
boarded and searched without warrant or consent under the authority of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
(FMCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-22. Comparing the ship's cumulative
catch log with their estimates of the amount of frozen fish stored
in the ship, government agents concluded that there had been
intentional underlogging of the incidental catch. Defendant vessel
and her documents were seized and taken to Kodiak, Alaska,
where subsequent searches, also without warrant, disclosed a discrepancy of more than 160 metric tons between the vessel's log and
the fish in possession. The United States brought action seeking
forfeiture of defendant vessel for violation of 16 U.S.C. §9 1821,
1854 and the implementing regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 611.9(d)(2)
(vi)-(viii) and 611.9(d)(3). Defendant fishing company, alleging
that the search of the vessel and seizure of its documents were
invalid without warrant, moved to dismiss the complaint. The
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court denied defendant's motion, holding that the fourth amendment was no bar to warrantless searches authorized to protect
the fishery conservation zone (200 mile limit). Examining the
language and legislative history of the FMCA, the court noted
that the Act authorized warrantless inspections and searches of
fishing vessels licensed under the Act for the purpose of the legislation's enforcement. The court further maintained that both
federal interest in fisheries and pervasive and historic regulation
of the fishing industry brought this case within the exception to
the warrant requirement. Since the permit which allowed defendant vessel to fish in the conservation zone, 16 U.S.C. § 1824,
incorporates the regulations of the FMCA, the court concluded
that the Japanese vessel was on notice of the possibility of warrantless search and seizure for violation of the provisions of the
Act. In conclusion, the court emphasized that the authority to
use the warrantless search provisions of the FMCA is carefully
limited to fishing vessels in the fishing conservation zone, and
the scope of the search is implicitly limited to those areas of the
ship that must be inspected to enforce the fishing regulations.
Significance - The instant decision demonstrates domestic
judicial support for strictly enforcing the FCMA beyond the
customary 12-mile limit. United States v. Tsuda Maru, 470 F.
Supp. 1223 (D. Alaska 1979).
4. CUSTOMS AND TRADE REGULATION
SCOPE OF LACEY
TECr WILDLIFE

ACT

is LIMrED TO FOREIGN LAWS DESIGNED TO PRO-

The United States brought indictments against defendants involved in smuggling snakes and other reptiles into the United
States in violation of the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43. The Lacey Act
imposes penalties on anyone who transports, sells, receives, or purchases any wildlife taken, transported, or sold in violation of any
law or regulation of a foreign country. Defendants were charged
with smuggling reptiles in violation of the laws of Fiji and Papua
New Guinea. The United States appealed the district court's dismissal of those counts based on violations of legislation and regulations promulgated in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The instant
court relied on both expert testimony and legislative history and
rejected the charge based on the Fiji law but allowed the charge
based on Papua New Guinea regulations. On the basis of expert
testimony, the court held that the Fiji law is not for the protection
of wildlife, but is instead revenue legislation and therefore the
Lacey Act is inapplicable. Conversely, the court accepted expert
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testimony that the Papua-New Guinea law is for the protection
of wildlife, thereby triggering the Lacey Act. Significance - This
case indicates the the court will rely on foreign law experts to
determine whether the foreign law is for the protection of wildlife
and therefore subject to the Lacey Act. United States v. Molt, 599
F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir. 1979).

